Desubjugating Childhoods by Listening to the Child s Voice and Childhoods at Play by Kallio, Kirsi Pauliina
 
 
This document has been downloaded from  
Tampub – The Institutional Repository of University of Tampere 
 
 
 
 
 
Publisher's version  
  
Authors: Kallio Kirsi Pauliina 
Name of article: Desubjugating Childhoods by Listening to the Child’s Voice and Childhoods at Play 
Year of 
publication: 2011 
Name of journal: ACME : An International E-journal for Critical Geographies 
Number of issue: Forthcoming 
ISSN: 1492-9732 
Discipline: Social sciences / Social and economic geography 
Language: en 
School/Other 
Unit:  School of Management  
 
URN: http://urn.fi/urn:nbn:uta-3-477  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All material supplied via TamPub is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, and 
duplication or sale of all part of any of the repository collections is not permitted, except that material 
may be duplicated by you for your research use or educational purposes in electronic or print form. 
You must obtain permission for any other use. Electronic or print copies may not be offered, whether 
for sale or otherwise to anyone who is not an authorized user. 
 
 
 
 
Desubjugating Childhoods by Listening to the 
Child’s Voice and Childhoods at Play 
 
Kirsi Pauliina Kallio1 
 
University of Tampere/Academy of Finland,  
Space and Political Agency Research Group  
kirsipauliina.kallio@uta.fi  
   
Abstract  
The article discusses the childhood discourse that is based on the United 
Nations’ Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and particularly on the 
principle of hearing the child’s voice which is firmly embedded in it. Two major 
issues are addressed. First, it is shown how children’s counter-knowledges that do 
not endorse, follow or conform to the ‘UNCRC childhood’ are typically 
disqualified as the child’s voice. Second, it is argued that participatory processes 
that are often introduced as a means for hearing children’s voices effectively may 
also  mask,  bury  or  silence  some  children’s  understandings  and  experiences.  On  
these grounds, insights are discussed with the aim of developing a less participatory 
approach to bring children’s voices to the fore. Foucault’s conception of 
desubjugated knowledges is introduced as a starting point for recognising and 
qualifying situated knowledges in childhood.  
Introduction 
The  bygone  20th  century  has  come  to  be  recognised  as  ‘the  century  of  the  
child’, as farsightedly predicted by Ellen Key (1900) a hundred years earlier. 
Starting from the League of Nations’ Geneva Declaration (1924), and the United 
Nations’ Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959), to the latest Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (UN 1989) ratified by almost all countries, children and 
their lives have held a prominent place on the human rights agenda. Children’s 
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special position as citizens and community members was first officially recognised 
by intergovernmental bodies. Yet a specific concern for childhood and children has 
since developed in national and local contexts, too. It has been well established that 
children are not just little adults with inadequate capabilities and restricted 
citizenship,  but  that  they  are  distinctive  members  of  their  communities  and  
societies. 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) is a global agreement 
to provide children with universal, subjective rights. Like human rights in general, 
children’s rights concern all individuals, irrespective of family, race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, 
property, disability, birth or other status (Article 2). They are often divided into the 
rights to provision, protection and participation that should be followed in all 
actions concerning children. This set of rights has become so established by 
researchers, administrators and policy practitioners that it is generally referred to as 
the ‘3Ps principle’ (e.g. Alderson, 2008). Together with the fourth central principle 
backing up the Convention, that of ‘the best interests of the child’2, it captures the 
basic ethos of the UNCRC (CRC, 2009).  
While the UNCRC can undoubtedly be viewed as a victory in the global 
struggle for human rights, there are some problematic issues and contradictions 
pertaining to it. For instance, by granting children rights to protection/provision 
and participation, the UNCRC produces ambiguity which complicates the 
implementation of the Convention through regulations and legislation. According 
to Evans and Spicer (2008), this ambiguity, which has gained the attention of a 
number of scholars in the past ten years, has already started to blur the line between 
prevention and participation discourses. This blurring has not only complicated the 
implementation of children’s rights but has also engendered some common ground 
in  the  interpretation  and  usage  of  the  UNCRC.  Most  importantly,  ‘the  child’s  
voice’ has been found as a common denominator that links the four basic principles 
constructively. It has thus become one of the central features in the predominant 
childhood discourse. 
However benevolent, the concept of the child’s voice is also a contested one 
which  deserves  to  be  reflected  on  critically.  In  this  article  I  show  that  children  
constantly present counter-knowledges that are not identified as the child’s voice 
because they do not endorse, follow or conform to the ‘UNCRC childhood’. 
Moreover, I portray how projects that aim explicitly at children’s empowerment 
through voice-giving may unintentionally mask, bury or silence their experiences 
and views. Hence it becomes evident that new approaches to bring children’s 
situated knowledges forth more extensively need to be developed. In this paper, 
Foucault’s conception of (de)subjugated knowledges is employed as a 
methodological starting point in the search for, and disclosure of, children’s 
                                               
2 Article 3: In all actions concerning children […] the best interests of the child shall be a primary 
consideration. This principle was the main concern of the 1959 Declaration. 
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awareness, experiences and understandings. In conclusion I suggest that in 
particular the knowledges that are contradictory to the dominant discourse can be 
made more perceptible by listening to concerns that are presented in various 
‘voiceless’ forms of lived childhoods (Kallio & Häkli, 2011a). To unearth these 
unvoiced concerns extensively and non-selectively, the theorisation on sociospatial 
positionality can be found as a helpful vantage point. 
The child’s voice in the UNCRC childhood discourse 
The concept of the child’s voice is based mainly on the 12th article  of  the  
UNCRC, which states that ‘in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child 
[should be] given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the 
child’3.  In  their  reading  of  this  principle,  the  UN Committee on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC, 2009) states that ‘States parties are under strict obligation to undertake 
appropriate measures to fully implement this right for all children—this article 
establishes  not  only  a  right  in  itself,  but  should  also  be  considered  in  the  
interpretation  and  implementation  of  all  other  rights’.  In  practice  this  means  that  
‘children, including the very youngest children, be respected as persons in their 
own right. Young children should be recognised as active members of families, 
communities and societies, with their own concerns, interests and points of view’ 
(CRC, 2005). Listening to children’s voices hence implies that children are heard 
in their daily environments in all situations and not merely through (semi-)official 
consultation procedures and participatory projects. Ideally, their experiences, 
understandings and views should inform all practices, decision-making and 
planning concerning childhood in general and children’s lived worlds in particular, 
including those linked to their protection and provision – on all spatial scales.  
As a concept, the child’s voice thus brings together the basic principles of the 
UNCRC and, at least partly, overcomes the ambiguity between them. Being a 
morally-reasoned human right that has been conferred on all human beings by the 
United Nation’s Universal Declaration on Human Rights, it has been 
acknowledged as an indisputable virtue that enjoys wide acceptance and is 
promoted by researchers and policymakers alike throughout the world. Yet if we 
look at how childhoods unfold in the world, following Hannah Arendt’s (1958) 
advice, there is much more to it than what first meets the eye.  
The first dilemma pertains to the UNCRC childhood discourse per se. One of 
the central aims of the Convention has been to define what ‘childhood’ is, i.e. 
which conditions are desirable and which ones can be included universally within 
the scope of (good) childhood. This starting point greatly effects how and which 
children’s voices are heard. The UNCRC begins by portraying the child as ‘every 
human being below the age of eighteen years, unless under the law applicable to 
the child, majority is attained earlier’. Starting from this definition, it draws 
distinctions between the child and other human beings, specifying a particular 
                                               
3 Other essential articles related to this right are 2, 3, 5, 6, 13, and 17, as portrayed by the CRC (2009). 
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conception of childhood in its 54 articles. This conception is not interpreted in 
unison – even the States parties of the Convention are far from unanimous in their 
interpretations and reservations concerning the treaty (see the UN Treaty 
Collection, 2011). The UNCRC is the result of a complex, long-term struggle, and 
there are many ways of reading it, some of which are more critical than others 
(Detrick, 1992, for critical readings see Roche, 1999; Harris-Short, 2001; Kallio & 
Häkli, 2011b). Yet, the relevance of children’s universal rights is seldom 
questioned, and there are a number of key themes in the Convention, such as the 
principles introduced above, which have been widely acknowledged and which are 
constantly drawn upon both in policymaking and research (e.g. Such & Walker, 
2005; Skelton, 2007; Whitty & Wisby, 2007; Evans & Spicer, 2008).  
There is hence a strong ‘double hermeneutic’ dynamism that underlies the 
UNCRC-led childhood discourse and promotes its extensive establishment. As a 
broadly accepted means of making sense of the society, analytical concepts not 
only reflect but also construct social practices (Giddens, 1987). The ensuing 
discursive hegemony makes it difficult and sometimes impossible for other 
childhood discourses to be heard or noticed, which is problematic also in terms of 
the child’s voice. As the UNCRC sets out to support certain kinds of childhoods, 
those lived worlds that do not fit the given conception are not identified as normal 
or desirable ones, but quite the contrary. The deviations are often defined as 
problems or hindrances that should be solved and corrected.  
Consequently, if young individuals portray views that contradict with the 
UNCRC discourse, they are not typically accepted as the child’s voice that should 
be heard but pathologised as something else. This means that children’s voices do 
not get heard if they are based on ‘wrong childhoods’, and the biased conceptions 
of childhood are not diversified on the basis of these children’s situated lives. A 
brief example presented by Pekka Haavisto, the UN Senior Advisor in the Darfur 
peace process and the previous EU Special Representative for Sudan and Darfur 
(2005–2007), makes a case in point4. The young boys living in the conflict area at 
the refugee camps have two future prospects: to carry water from the well for their 
mothers or join the rebel groups to fight alongside with men. Having lived the 
whole of their lives at the camp, few find the previous more inviting. Yet their 
willingness to participate in the violent conflict is rarely brought up in terms of the 
child’s voice.  
Another problematic, yet less frequently noticed, aspect pertaining to the 
child’s voice concerns participatory practices that have been introduced widely as a 
means for hearing children. The idea of participatory involvement is to engage 
children in projects where they can, in one way or another, voice their concerns, 
state their opinions, and take action in the matters that are being processed. As 
children get engaged with research, development, administration and policymaking 
                                               
4 Presented in a research seminar on International Relations at the University of Tampere, March 17th 2011. 
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processes that seek to hear their voices and empower them, it is not normally 
recognised that, as an unintentional consequence, this action may also undermine 
children’s social positions, in more ways than one. Such risks can be realised by, 
for instance, acknowledging how governmental rationality, i.e. governmentality, 
works through this voice-giving (e.g. Bragg, 2007; Mannion, 2007; Gallacher and 
Gallagher, 2008; for governmentality see Häkli, 2009).  
From the governmentality point of view, when children’s voices are 
constituted and mobilised through participatory techniques, the risk of drowning 
their own experiences and views is threefold (for a more detailed account see 
Kallio & Häkli, 2011b). Firstly, the children who get involved are typically 
recruited to participate in distinct ways on selected issues, for the production of a 
particular kind of information (cf. Venn, 2007, 122). These ways, issues and 
information follow, more or less directly, some reading of the dominant childhood 
discourse, meaning that the concerns that can be voiced are selected. Secondly, at 
the  same  time  as  these  voices  do  get  heard,  others  are  silenced.  The  experiences  
and views of those children who are not involved in participatory work easily get 
subjugated as ‘naïve, hierarchically inferior, non-scientific, or otherwise not 
acceptable’ if they do not support the participating children’s views and/or follow 
the given reading of the dominant childhood discourse (Foucault, 2003, 6-8). Thus, 
they  are  prone  to  be  unrecognised  as  the  child’s  voice.  Thirdly,  the  participating  
children’s knowledges, too, may paradoxically get silenced in participatory 
procedures. As they undertake participation on the set grounds, their potential to act 
on different grounds is hindered. If their own ways of acting, the issues they find 
important, and the information that they normally produce in their everyday lives 
differ notably from those exploited in the participatory project, the recruitment 
aspect makes it very difficult for them to exercise the child’s voice on their own 
grounds. 
Bringing these problematic matters together reveals that hearing children’s 
voices universally is not a simple task and that the predominant ways of giving 
voice to children are not adequate in order to qualify all children’s knowledges. 
Next, after a brief introduction to Foucault’s methodology, I portray some 
empirical illustrations that shed more light on these two aspects. I discuss both 
minority and majority world childhoods to emphasise that, regardless of the 
geographical context, the idea of hearing children’s voices may fail in at least three 
ways. Children’s knowledges can be subjugated by defining their lives as ‘non-
childhoods’, by recruiting them in participatory practices that channel their voices, 
and by concealing their voices with other children’s voices that are defined as the 
child’s voice.  
The first illustration is grounded in a selection of documents produced by 
UNICEF concerning children’s familial roles which reveal that, when blatantly 
contradictory with the dominant childhood discourse, children’s knowledges are 
not identified as the child’s voice. The second set of reflections discusses certain 
knowledges that are masked, buried or silenced in participatory processes, to 
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portray the problems related to the voice-giving involvement. In conclusion, some 
less participatory means for qualifying children’s situated knowledges are 
discussed. As I have argued elsewhere concerning young people, this approach 
aims to advance particularly the social and political positions of those children who 
are underprivileged and ‘hardest to reach’ with participatory methods (Matthews, 
2001; Kallio & Häkli, 2011a).  
Disclosing situated knowledges with archaeological tools and genealogical 
means 
When Michel Foucault started to work as a professor of the history of 
systems  of  thought  at  the  Collège de France in 1970, he began developing his 
research methodology from an archaeological mode towards a more genealogical 
approach. In the opening lecture to the Il faut defendre la société lecture course in 
1976, he elaborates this transition (Foucault 2003, 10–11): ‘Archaeology is the 
method specific to the analysis of local discursivities, and genealogy is the tactic 
which, once it has described these local discursivities, brings into play the 
desubjugated knowledges that have been released from them.’ In his archaeological 
reading of this lecture passage, Chris Philo (2007, 348) notes that Foucault wanted 
to  say  that  he  had  not  turned  away  from  archaeological  work  but,  rather,  was  
expanding his methodological apparatus. Philo purports to show that, in his later 
work, Foucault did not distinguish between the terrains of discourse and everyday 
social life, as is sometimes suggested. Instead, he wanted to use the 
archaeologically unearthed knowledge, employing genealogical means to new ends 
– to write out histories informed by desubjugated knowledges.  
As Elden (2001) points out, during the first half of the 1970s Foucault took 
up various themes which he discarded later or left unprocessed, but the completion 
of Discipline and Punish in 1975 marked the end of one research period. To the 
extent that methodology can ever be ready, it was at this point that Foucault had 
developed the tools he needed for discursive critique. Later on he extended this 
apparatus in his studies on biopolitics and governmentality, yet this work did not 
transfigure  the  basic  ideas  of  the  methodological  approach  (for  an  overview  see  
Häkli, 2009). In this article I draw on Foucault’s methodology as it is presented in 
Society Must Be Defended and elaborated in the following lecture series Territory, 
Security and Population.  
The archaeological-genealogical methodology of discursive critique builds 
on the analysis of subjugated local knowledges which can be elicited in two ways. 
First, particular historical contents can be used as proof of the struggles and battles 
that are fought during the production of certain truths. To fulfil the criteria of such 
content, the local knowledge must have been hidden or veiled in functional 
coherences and formal systematisations. Moreover, they should help us to reveal 
the dividing lines that this masking is designed to hide. Second, disqualified 
knowledges bring out subjugated knowledges from another direction. They may be 
naïve, hierarchically inferior, non-scientific, or otherwise not acceptable 
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knowledges  and  appear  in  different  forms  –  for  instance  as  acts,  beings  or  
arguments. Their central feature is that they have not been counted as ‘knowledge’. 
To be defined as ‘disqualified’, in relation to other mundane knowledges, they need 
to differ from the ‘qualified’ knowledges to such an extent that, in Foucault’s 
(2003, 6-8) words, their power lies only in the fact that they differ from all other 
knowledges. 
Accordingly, the archaeological part of discursive critique comprises the 
delving into, digging up and dusting off of the local knowledges that are buried in 
and masked by the very histories and truths that we know and accept. The 
genealogical phase that follows this excavation, however, sets to release, i.e. 
desubjugate, these knowledges, in order to write new histories that do not attempt 
to tell the truth about the past but to grasp truths concerning the present. The 
definitive endeavour of discursive critique is the insurrection of subjugated 
knowledges (Foucault, 2003, 9):  
 [Genealogies] are about the insurrection of knowledges […], primarily, 
an insurrection against the centralizing power-effects that are bound up 
with the institutionalization and workings of any scientific discourse 
organized in a society such as ours. That this institutionalization of 
scientific discourse is embodied in a university or, in general terms, a 
pedagogical apparatus, that this institutionalization of scientific 
discourses is embodied in a theoretico-commercial network such as 
psychoanalysis, or in a political apparatus – with everything that 
implies – is largely irrelevant. Genealogy has to fight the power-effects 
characteristic of any discourse that is regarded as scientific. 
The double hermeneutically-developing UNCRC childhood discourse 
unquestionably entails these kinds of centralising power effects that are bound up 
with the institutionalisation and workings of scientific discourses. It thus presents 
an opportune case for discursive critique that aims at the insurrection of children’s 
subjugated knowledges and the redefinition of the histories of the present 
childhoods. The orientation parallels Goodale’s (2006) ‘critical intellectual history 
of  human  rights’  approach  that  sets  off  from  an  anthropological  basis.  As  an  
analytical departure point, he makes a distinction between ‘universal’ and 
‘universalist’ methodologies, where the former refers to the ontological nature of 
human rights and the latter to a range of ideas and social practices that emerge in 
relation to universal claims. A universalist approach to human rights employed by 
Goodale (2006, 27) provides: 
 [A]n  anthropology  that  studies  the  social  force  of  the  idea  of  human  
rights, the way different actors encounter and shape the idea of human 
rights as part of broader forms of social and legal practice. Human 
rights embody a set of ideas about the world that have become 
dominant, and a critical intellectual history of this development would 
locate the appropriation, vernacularization, politicization of, and 
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resistance to human rights within the broader histories that help explain 
these  “local”  encounters.  —  And  as  recent  ethnographic  studies  of  
human rights have confirmed, power, knowledge, and violence do 
indeed come together in an intense and often dangerous swirl in the 
legal and political contexts in which universal human rights discourse 
is invoked. An anthropology of human rights can shed light on this 
multiplicity  of  power  within  human  rights  processes.  Moreover,  if  an  
anthropology of human rights is, by definition, an anthropology of 
power–knowledge–violence, then it will lend itself to a kind of cultural 
critique that has been missing within international human rights theory 
and practice, especially over the last 15 years.  
Before moving on, I wish to emphasise that the subsequent analyses should not be 
taken as addressing childhood standards or child policy principles per se. The 
illustrations and examples are neither to be understood as statements of any kind 
concerning the particular aspects of the childhoods they disclose. Instead of 
viewing childhood and human rights as ontological entities, I take a relational 
approach to both. This is to say that I am not principally engaging with the cultural 
relativism debate that ponders the universality of children’s rights but, like Goodale 
(2006), Ortner (2006) and others who employ practice theoretical approaches, I 
focus on the universalism of children’s rights – their unfolding and meanings in the 
world of power–knowledge–violence where children lead their lives.  
Silencing children through functional coherences and formal systematisations 
In the past twenty years, the UNCRC-led childhood discourse has taken on a 
global position as representing what childhood is or at  least  should be like.  It  has 
been approved of by most supra-national governmental and non-governmental 
organisations addressing childhood issues, and it is widely employed as a starting 
point for national legislation and institutional strategies. The general principles of 
the UNCRC also offer a seemingly neutral tool for use by local child policy 
practitioners, and a shared language for multi-disciplinary cooperation on micro 
and macro scales. Concurrently, a broad branch of research has set out to promote 
the implementation of the UNCRC in policymaking, development work and 
research practices (e.g. Such and Walker, 2005; Roose and Bouverne-De Bie, 
2007; Skelton, 2007; Bell, 2008). In Foucault’s terms, it can thus be understood as 
a regime of truth that constitutes the social world as governable and administrable 
(Häkli, 2009). 
The United Nations Centre for Human Rights (1996) asserts that the 
Convention ‘has the same meaning for people in all parts of the world’ and that it 
‘takes into account the different cultural, social, economic and political realities of 
individual States.’ Yet it was realised early on, even when the UNCRC was being 
prepared, that the concept of childhood proposed in it did not allow for certain 
culturally relativistic approaches in its interpretation and implementation (for an 
overview, see Detrick, 1992; Harris-Short, 2001). The UN rights derive largely 
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from Western conceptions of proper childhood, determined first in the post-war 
period for the Declaration (emphasis on provision and protection), and completed 
during the 1980s when the Convention was being prepared (most importantly the 
participation aspect). This, in itself, is not a novel finding, but the academic critique 
presented against the discourse has not succeeded in undermining its hegemonic 
status (e.g. Boyden, 1990, 191; Stephens, 1995; Woodhead, 1997, 80; Kulynych, 
2001; Chirwa, 2002; Jones, 2005). In mainstream research and policymaking it is 
still acceptable to base one’s arguments on the UNCRC without discussing the 
foundational complications embedded in it.  
This is evident, for instance, in the policy line endorsed by the United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), rooted in the UNCRC: ‘UNICEF’s mission is 
to advocate for the protection of children’s rights, to help meet their basic needs 
and to expand their opportunities to reach their full potential. UNICEF is guided in 
doing this by the provisions and principles of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child.’ (UNICEF, 2011). In the following, I illustrate the socially constructed 
nature of the dominant childhood discourse by showing how UNICEF portrays 
children as family members. Following the cultural relativism critique, the 
illustration reveals that the regime of truth that was engendered on the basis of the 
UNCRC is not based on children’s knowledges and lived worlds at large but draws 
on rather selected understandings and interpretations. The functional coherences 
and formal systematisations built up and mobilised by actors such as UNICEF 
present this conception as the childhood. The voices arising from ‘wrong 
childhoods’ do not echo at the back of the normative discourse and, as becomes 
apparent, UNICEF, regardless of the critique, continues to mask, bury and silence 
many children’s knowledges in its present work.  
Creating conformity: The child as a family member 
The UNCRC conception of children as family members offers one vantage 
point into the way childhood is portrayed in the dominant childhood discourse, 
exemplifying the foundational problems pertaining to its hegemony. While ‘family’ 
is not clearly defined, the first twenty articles outline it as a basic unit of a national 
institution consisting of the child, his/her parents and/or other legal guardians, and 
possibly other members – presumably other children under the parents/guardians’ 
custody, and the extended family and local community (Harris-Short, 2001). Yet in 
most cases the only family relations mentioned are those between the child and 
his/her parents. Children’s familial role thus more or less equals that of a person 
under parental custody. In this narrow and categorical conception of children’s 
familial roles and communal positions, the UNCRC ends up either excluding a 
great number of young individuals or pathologising many lived childhoods. 
Leaning on the UNCRC, UNICEF portrays all young people who are married 
and/or have children of their own before the age of 18 as oppressed children. In a 
recent report concerning women below 18 years of age in underdeveloped and 
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developing countries5, UNICEF (2008) states that: ‘Required to perform large 
amounts of domestic work, under pressure to demonstrate fertility, and responsible 
for raising children while still children themselves, married girls and child mothers 
face constrained decision-making and reduced life choices.’ The complement 
presented in the 1st Article of the UNCRC – ‘unless under the law applicable to the 
child, majority is attained earlier’ –  is  not  used  to  narrow  down  the  category  of  
young people whom these statements concern (see Figures 1 and 2). Therefore, all 
people from 0 to17 living in marriage or having children of their own are portrayed 
as underprivileged beings with no future or good standard of living to hope for, 
leading pathological childhoods by definition. In proportion to them, the other 
teenagers who are not married or have children of their own are presumed to lead 
relatively  better  lives  due  to  their  ‘normal’  family  relations,  regardless  of  the  
context.  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Number of women aged 20–24 who were married or in a union 
before the age of 18, selected countries (UNICEF’s ChildInfo, 2006). 
                                               
5 UNICEF employs this geographical focus in their analysis, discussing the marriages and child births of 
children living in economically advanced societies elsewhere, e.g. in the context of well-being and health 
(UNICEF, 2007a). Other human rights organizations analyse and report these issues more globally (e.g. 
Population Action International, 2007). 
MORE THAN 60 MILLION CHILD BRIDES 
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Figure  2:  Underage  women’s  age  of  first  birth,  selected  countries  (Jensen  &  
Thornton, 2003; UNICEF, 2005). 
The statistics presented by UNICEF (2005) show that at the beginning of the 
21st century there were millions of girls in the majority world who had got married 
before coming of age (Figures 1 and 2). According to the organisation, they were 
being oppressed by early marriage and often also by having a child of their own 
before the age of eighteen. The message is underlined by endorsing extreme 
representations, typically portraying very young girls and elderly men in organised 
marriages (Figure 3). Respectively, as oppression and the potential harm caused by 
early marriage and childbirth are emphasised and generalised, young people’s 
position as spouses and parents is not discussed at all (cf. Robson 2004). 
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Figure 3: The winner of the UNICEF-sponsored international ‘Photo of the 
Year’ competition (UNICEF, 2007b).  
The benefits of being married and having the first child during the late teens 
in the socio-cultural and geo-economic location where these lives are led do not 
constitute  a  point  of  interest  in  UNICEF’s  statistics  and  reports.  For  instance,  the  
family institutions based on guardianship, where marriage and childbirth may be 
crucial in providing young individuals with wellbeing and good living conditions, 
are not identified or reflected upon (White, 2007). Neither are unions where both 
spouses are relatively young mentioned as exceptions. This is odd because, for 
instance in Zambia, the age difference between spouses is typically less than ten 
years in unions where the wife is younger than 20 years of age (UNICEF, 2005, 
37). The life expectancy of Zambians being below 40 years of age, the pertinence 
of these marriages can hardly be questioned on the grounds highlighted in Figure 3. 
Rather, it is the HIV/AIDS phenomenon that presents notable challenges to 
Zambian marriages at large. Interestingly, these viewpoints were brought up when 
the UNCRC was being prepared, where it was suggested by many representatives 
that, since the age of fifteen is typically considered as a minimum age for marriage, 
the Convention should concern only people below this age (Detrick, 1992, 115). 
Had this age limit been selected, UNICEF would probably identify fewer child 
brides by some millions in the world.  
Following Foucault, the definitions and alignments mobilised by UNICEF 
operate as functional coherences and formal systematisations. Without 
downplaying the fact that some young individuals are forced into early marriage 
and childbirth against their will, and that in certain locations socioeconomic 
conditions encourage the parents to marry their daughters off at an early stage, this 
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approach does not allow for various cultural, social, economic and political 
realities. The approach does not acknowledge those people’s local knowledges who 
are comfortably married at an early age, or the views of those who feel that they 
have not managed to get married early enough, or the experiences of the youth who 
cannot lead satisfying lives due to their unmarried status (e.g. Robson, 2004; Kesby 
et al., 2006; White, 2007). Neither does it include the views of those families 
where children and adults together attend to the family, sharing responsibilities for 
livelihood, childcare, housework, and so on (e.g. Punch, 2001).  
The alienating and strongly evaluative discourse (re)produced by UNICEF on 
the grounds of the UNCRC is consistent with Foucault’s (1961, 1975, 1976) 
findings concerning ‘madmen’ in proportion to the sane life, ‘criminals’ in terms of 
citizenship and freedom, and ‘homosexuals’ from a heteronormative point of view. 
Without taking sides over the question of appropriate ages for marriage or 
childbirth (or the terms of sanity, criminality and sexuality), it can be found that in 
its conception of children’s family  relations  UNICEF  states  very  clearly  what  is  
desirable and what is not in terms of young people’s family building and communal 
status – regardless of their living environments. This normative statement is not 
only culturally and geographically biased but also considerably political (Stephens, 
1995, 20; cf. the normalising effects of heteronormativity, e.g. Browne et al., 
2007). By masking millions of lives as ‘inappropriate’, the interpretation hides the 
fact that young individuals who are entitled to the basic rights proposed by the 
UNCRC (free education, protection from hard labour, etc.) may nevertheless live in 
union and have children of their own. The knowledges about such normal and good 
childhoods ought to be qualified as children’s voices, too, to diversify the dominant 
conception of childhood and discursively desubjugate these childhoods. 
This brief illustration is by no means an exhaustive assessment of the 
hegemonic  discourse  on  childhood,  but  it  serves  well  to  demonstrate  how  the  
UNCRC has ended up promoting particular kinds of childhoods (Ruddick, 2003; 
Skelton, 2007). As one of the most important global children’s rights actors, 
UNICEF  defines  certain  kinds  of  childhoods  as  ‘normal  and  good’  and  others  as  
‘deviant and unwanted’ on the basis of the UNCRC. They produce functional 
coherence and formal systematisations that are mobilised by thousands and 
thousands of children’s rights advocates, policymakers and practitioners on 
multiple scalar levels all around the world. At the same time, UNICEF and all of 
these actors effectively state who can use the child’s voice. By suggesting that 
young people should marry and have children only after they have turned 18, 
regardless of cultural differences, their economic situation, life expectancy, 
religious traditions, or any other code, norm or condition, they disqualify millions 
of  children’s  local  knowledges,  veil  a  number  of  childhoods,  and  turn  these  
people’s lives into subjugated historical contents.  
In Foucault’s (1979, 183) terms, such a policy line can be understood as a 
disciplinary technique which aims at normalising children and their childhoods 
according to (arbitrary) norms. Therefore, it forms one of the major problems 
Running Header Here: Times, 9 point font 14 
embedded in the UNCRC. According to his methodological approach, this 
hegemony can be undermined by bringing into play children’s knowledges that 
differ totally from the knowledges qualified by the dominant childhood discourse, 
consequently revealing such historical contents of children’s lives that have been 
hidden or veiled in functional coherences and formal systematisations, thus making 
space for divergent children’s voices. Scholars in various disciplines have 
demonstrated this successfully through a number of case studies by approaching 
distinct childhoods from culturally sensitive starting points (e.g. Stephens, 1995; 
Freeman, 2000; Katz, 2004; Punch, 2001; Robson, 2004; Kesby et al., 2006; 
Kjørholt, 2007; Lund, 2007; White, 2007; Bühler-Niedenberger and Krieken, 2008; 
Kallio, 2008; Pence and Morfo, 2008; Vanderbeck, 2009). Nearly without 
exception, participatory methods have been employed to uncover children’s 
situated knowledges and to bring their voices to the fore. Though often successful, 
participatory work also entails complications, which I shall now discuss. 
(Dis)qualifying children’s knowledges in participatory processes 
Critiques  of  the  UNCRC  tend  to  focus  on  ethnic  and  cultural  differences,  
recognising that its Western bias is its innermost problem, as portrayed in the 
previous section. The debate on children’s participation and the ambiguity of 
children’s rights comprises an exception to these by concentrating mainly, but not 
exclusively, on minority world childhoods. For instance, children’s differing roles 
in welfare and security policies have been studied extensively in the last ten years 
(e.g. Such and Walker 2005; Skelton 2007; Whitty and Wisby 2007; Evans and 
Spicer 2008). To mention just a few studies, in their analysis of British family and 
crime policies, Such and Walker (2005) reveal that the components of the ‘3Ps’ are 
not adopted appropriately in British child policies either. Children are treated as 
responsible citizens when they commit crimes or violate institutional norms but are 
not trusted in issues concerning their everyday family lives (see also James, 2011). 
Equally, Skelton (2007) presents a critique of UNICEF’s implementation of the 
participation principle. She argues that even in Western contexts the organisation 
has failed to involve children and young people in decision-making and continues 
to confront them as ‘innocent beings’ or ‘future becomings’ (cf. Uprichard, 2008). 
These critiques of current Western child policies have questioned the 
UNCRC both as an ethos and a set of practices. Yet even these studies seldom 
target the latest child policy trend, the participatory involvement per se. When 
carried out with communicative means and recognising the challenges proposed by 
the ambiguity of children’s rights, these policies are commonly welcomed by 
children’s spokesmen, NGOs and many researchers. However, to take Foucault’s 
(1980) notion of the relationship between power and knowledge seriously, we 
should critically consider also those perceptions and implementations of the 
UNCRC that aim to endorse participation. This notion has been made in several 
critiques concerning mainstream approaches to childhood in the past few years 
(e.g. Vandenbroeck and Bouverne-de Bie, 2006; Bragg, 2007; Mannion, 2007; 
White, 2007; Gallacher and Gallagher, 2008; Vanderbeck, 2008). By asking which 
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knowledges are qualified and disqualified, and which historical contents are 
brought forth and buried in participatory practices, we can make better sense of 
how children and young people’s voices do or do not get heard. 
The second set of reflections sets out to reveal the dilemma embedded in the 
ideal of participatory involvement. This allows the contemplation of the child’s 
voice from a direction totally different from the previous one. In the minority world 
contexts that I next present, the starting points, norms and justifications of 
children’s rights appear much more normal, natural and easily adjusted, and the 
socially constructed nature of childhood that builds on the dominant discourse may, 
at first, seem less problematic. Yet a closer look reveals that children’s local 
knowledges may be hidden, veiled and disqualified in participatory settings and 
minority world contexts, too, even if in diverse ways. 
The unintended consequences of participatory involvement 
The current trend in Western6 child policies is to involve underage people to 
participate in institutional, local, national and supra-national planning and decision-
making processes. It is argued that because children cannot act as responsible 
political actors like adults they need to be given tools for specific political agency 
with  the  help  of  participatory  strategies,  and  in  this  way  are  assisted to use their 
right to be heard in matters concerning them. In other words, the idea is to enhance 
children’s political agencies by ‘upgrading’ their societal status. This is deemed 
important because it is considered to empower children and young people as family 
members, pupils, community members, citizens, and so on (Sinclair, 2004; Lister, 
2007).  
Participatory child policies are generally designed in keeping with cultural, 
social, economic and political equality, following the UNCRC line, and 
implemented by constructive means with good intentions. Hence it is not surprising 
that children’s involvement is typically envisaged optimistically as a means to 
empowerment and not, for example, as unpredictable actorhood based on 
dissenting views, norms and interests (Gallagher, 2008). Overall, children’s 
participation is portrayed as having merely positive effects and not considered as 
something that may threaten or challenge adults’ politics, at least if the adult 
engagement is based on democratic values. In actual fact, it is repeatedly argued 
that the discouragement of participatory child and youth policies endorses the 
patriarchal oppression of children and young people, as brought out by Skelton 
(2007, 178): 
Just as men were, and are, reluctant to give up their established forms 
of  political  (and  other  types  of)  power  to  allow  women  to  play  a  
meaningful role, so adults will resist the loss of authority and power 
                                               
6 This trend can be found also in some supra-national and non-Western policies (e.g. UNICEF, 2002). Yet to 
link my arguments with the current Anglophone research that deals mostly with Western child policies, I 
delimit the discussion to them. 
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that a child-centred, young person–friendly model of democracy will 
require. Change can be wrought and children and young people can 
grasp power (with adult support and advocacy) but it will be a long, 
long struggle. 
Foucauldian interpretations of participation, however, reveal that there is 
another side to this story. Vendenbroeck and Bouverne-de Bie (2006, 136) argue 
that: ‘Active citizenship can be seen as an empowering concept giving a voice to 
children, but it can also be considered as a technique assuring coercion or as a 
strategy that governs at a distance through the art of self-examination. It can, 
finally, be seen as an example of an inclusive policy that excludes.’ Sympathetic to 
participatory practices but critical of their ideology, this insight reveals that 
participatory policies do not axiomatically empower children, nor do they self-
evidently underpin children’s political agency.  
Indeed, if politics is understood in terms of freedom of will and opinion, it 
leads us to ask whether children can act on their own grounds within this type of 
participatory involvement at all (Kallio & Häkli, 2011b). As policy actors they are, 
like everyone else, bound to self-examination which supports good government 
(Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Craddock, 2007; Venn, 2007). However, unlike their 
adult counterparts, children are not free to question the terms of this government. 
They cannot be made responsible for various aspects of their lives, for example, by 
endangering their health or choosing between school curricula (Kallio, 2007; Lund, 
2007). This position does not offer fruitful grounds for children’s potentially 
disagreeing voices7. 
Some substantial evidence of the unintended effects of participatory practices 
has recently been presented by researchers who have conducted long-standing 
participatory research projects with children. Drawing on an ethnographic research 
project, Gallacher and Gallagher (2008, 504) sum up that: ‘[T]o encourage children 
to participate in creating knowledge about themselves is also to encourage them to 
take part in the processes used to regulate them.’ They argue that ‘emphasising 
“participation” may actually serve to reduce the possibilities with a research 
encounter’, and requiring children to ‘participate might actually constrain the 
possibilities for them to act.’ (p.507). Gallagher (2008, 142) illustrates this paradox 
with an excerpt from his field work. Following the ideal of participatory research, 
he endeavoured to involve primary school children as knowledge producers in his 
                                               
7 This has also become apparent in the empirical research of our research group studying Finnish child and 
youth policies and children and young people’s participation. On the basis of our preliminary analysis, the 
more general critique of participation seems to apply to childhood and youth as well (see Kallio and Häkli 
2011b). We have interviewed municipal child and youth leaders to discover what kinds of issues and views are, 
and are not, presented by children and young people in participatory processes, and made acquaintance with the 
children and young people’s own perceptions through the reports that they have produced as part of their work 
in municipal and national Children’s Parliaments and Youth Forums. As the analysis is yet to be completed, I 
will not discuss the results here. For further information, please see the Space and political agency research 
group at the University of Tampere.  
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study through a block building project. To his distress, the process ended up 
placing one of the children in a subordinate position in her peer cultural 
community: as she tried to participate in the research project, she was unable to act 
appropriately in the ongoing peer cultural action. The corollary to this was that the 
other children made use of her weakened position by debarring her from the peer 
group and ruining her work. This could not be helped by the researcher who had no 
access to the webs of power embedded in the children’s mundane world. 
In a similar manner, Bragg (2007) noticed the two-way effects of her 
participatory research project. She claims that ‘[The Students as Researchers] 
project seems to promote practices of reflexivity and self-problematisation amongst 
those who carry out the research, encouraging them to take responsibility for 
themselves as well as contribute to school success’ (p.352). The interviews that she 
undertook with the primary and secondary school children who participated in the 
project revealed that the participants had taken on a double role: they conceived 
themselves  both  as  the  objects  and  subjects  of  knowledge  –  as  their  own  critics.  
Therefore, they no longer had access to the subject position of a pupil where they 
could complain about absurd educational methods or be weary of dull lessons and 
unpleasing food supplies. They were on the schools’ side now, feeling that by 
performing as docile students they would best assist in the common objectives, and 
that it was their own fault if they did not take the initiative to improve the matters 
they found disruptive. 
These examples help to concretise the Foucauldian concerns of children’s 
participation (more examples in Prout, 2000; Barker and Smith, 2001; Matthews, 
2001; James and James, 2004; Kesby, 2007; Evans & Spicer, 2008). In both cases, 
the children were involved in research projects as assistants but, at the same time, 
they had to act in their peer cultural communities and institutions, too. As they got 
engaged as research participants, their social positions and agencies changed 
unavoidably, leading to unpredictable and multiple results. The same goes with 
children’s involvement in policymaking, as I have argued elsewhere (Kallio & 
Häkli, 2011b). When children participate in formal arenas, they cannot cut loose 
from their quotidian relationships and communities. The adoption of new roles 
changes children’s agencies, statuses and positions in the complex social networks 
of their mundane environments thus bringing about some transformations in these 
communities8. Consequently, the relationships and power relations upon which 
peer  cultural  groups,  families,  school  communities,  etc.,  operate  have  to  be  
reconstructed and renegotiated, at least to some extent.  
For one more illustration, let us take a Foucauldian look at a participatory 
child policy model proposed by Such and Walker (2005, 54-55). Their policy 
analysis of the British ‘rights and responsibilities’ debate suggests that, to better 
serve children, policy must 1) Provide a space in which children can live and 
                                               
8 For a more detailed account on children’s political subjectification/socialization, see Kallio & Häkli (2011c). 
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express  their  own  childhoods;  2)  Understand  these  childhoods  in  the  present  and  
not in terms of their futurority; and 3) Learn from the private lives of children and 
families. These suggestions lean on their empirical findings, according to which 
children participate actively in the negotiation of responsibility at home and are 
able to take care of household chores without direct supervision ‘because they are 
trusted there’.  
From  these  starting  points,  Such  and  Walker  argue  that  responsibility  is  a  
meaningful and everyday aspect of many children’s lives, and that children would 
do responsible things if we trusted them more in policymaking since they would 
find it rational and desirable: ‘Children’s desire to do responsible things and their 
understanding that these can often stem from doing things responsibly offers a 
potential model for better engaging children and young people in policy and 
politics.’ (2004, p.55). In concrete terms, the authors suggest that the childhoods 
that children lead and experience in the space9 provided by participatory policies 
should be acknowledged in policymaking, i.e. qualified as acceptable knowledge. 
This suggestion is based on the supposition that since many children know how to 
act responsibly at home, and are willing to do so, they should be given the chance 
to act responsibly also more widely.  
Learning from Bragg’s study it can be assumed that, were this strategy 
implemented, some of the ‘responsible’ kids would probably readily participate in 
the ‘provided space’. Yet the whole idea of providing children with space for 
‘living and expressing childhood’ contradicts the idea that children are readily 
agents on their own right and not merely ‘becomings’ (Skelton, 2007). The paper 
thus ends up by implying that ‘without aid and encouragement from adult-designed 
“participatory methods” children cannot fully exercise their “agency”’, therefore 
accentuating adult-led voicing and not vice versa (Gallacher and Gallagher, 2008, 
503). The endorsement of children’s responsibility as proposed by Such and 
Walker would probably also lead to what Bragg (2007, 350) calls ‘hybrid 
identities’ through which children feel both obligated to and responsible for the 
functioning of a given child policy process – or ‘recruitment’, as articulated by 
Venn (2007, 122), that involves children in selected issues in distinct ways for the 
production of particular kind of information. When involved in policymaking as 
responsible actors, children are turned into docile dissident forces that, as part of 
the governing mechanism, are forced to adapt to good conduct through the conduct 
of conduct (Foucault, 1991). Such child policies act as biopolitics that direct 
societal development from inside out through children’s recruited subjectivities 
(Foucault, 2007).  
                                               
9 The essence of this ‘space’ is not explicated in the paper but presumably the idea parallels the one presented 
by the CRC (2009, 7): ‘States parties should encourage the child to form a free view and should provide an 
environment that enables the child to exercise her or his right to be heard.’ This is a prime example of the 
double-hermeneutic dynamism that underlies the dominant childhood discourse. 
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Furthermore, Such and Walker also fail to consider the fact that in the policy 
line they suggest, the less responsible, communicable and conformable children 
would probably not be able to, or even willing to, participate in this manner. 
Bragg’s (2007, 354) study evidenced that ‘those who cannot or will not measure up 
are marginalised as deviant and risky subjects who threaten the new normativity’ 
(for similar accounts see Tobin, 1995; Vandenbroeck and Bouverne-de Bie, 2006; 
Komulainen, 2007; Roose and Bouverne-de Bie, 2007; Eriksson and Näsman, 
2008).  Following governmental rationality, this kind of marginalisation is most 
efficiently mobilised through the responsibly participating children who scorn their 
indocile coevals. Hence, the involvement of certain children in policymaking helps 
to disqualify other children’s knowledges as not acceptable, thus endorsing 
inequality. 
To recap, as regards the child’s voice, the problem of participatory 
involvement is threefold: when the participating children are recruited to act on the 
set grounds, their action evolves selected voices and hinders both other children’s 
and their potential to act on their own grounds since differing knowledges are 
easily subjugated by the qualified child’s voice. These notions together reveal that 
participatory involvement alone cannot overcome the challenges related to listening 
to children’s voices. A critical perspective forces us to acknowledge that, 
regardless of good will and intentions, giving children opportunities to participate 
and get involved does not always ensure that their voices get heard appropriately 
and equally. Even though participatory practices are able to provide some children 
and young people with experiences of empowerment and a ‘voice’ in certain 
matters concerning them, diverse experiences are generated and other knowledges 
silenced in these processes. The inconvenience is that these mundane effects are 
hard to foresee and control. Therefore, original methodological approaches are 
needed to make childhoods audible and visible more extensively. 
Desubjugating childhoods by qualifying children’s situated knowledges 
Listening to children’s voices has been acknowledged as a valuable principle 
by researchers and policymakers worldwide in the past twenty years, and a means 
for the implementation of children’s rights have been developed from these starting 
points in a variety of contexts. However, as I have argued above, there are several 
complications embedded in this principle, not least because of its 
interconnectedness with the contested childhood discourse based on the UNCRC. 
Hence, new ways of approaching children and their lived worlds, and hearing 
children’s voices, are needed. One question that begs the answer is: how can 
children’s voices be heard without recruiting, banalising or homogenising them? 
A Foucauldian response to this question involves the qualification of 
children’s local knowledges and in this way the desubjugation of certain subjugated 
knowledges. In practice, this idea can be implemented in many ways. Those 
defending participatory methods often claim that the hearing of children’s voices 
requires that they are informed about and involved in processes as active 
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participants, regardless of the complications related to these methods (Kesby, 
2007). Yet if participation is identified as a central part of the problem, less and 
non-participatory methods ought to be develop. This requires that the analysis is 
based on the knowledges that children and young people generate and produce in 
their everyday practices, as actors in their lived worlds.  
To consider briefly how such ways of listening to children’s voices can be 
realised, I propose sociospatial positionality as grounds for distinguishing 
children’s situated knowledges in their lived worlds. In their recent article, Helga 
Leitner and Eric Sheppard (2009, 242–244) suggest this concept as a gateway to 
understanding how the social and the spatial co-evolve. Leaning on feminist 
geographical thinking they present that: ‘Positionality highlights difference, the 
situated understandings of subjects, groups, and institutions, but also inequality 
and, thereby, always power relations. Yet, a subject’s (institution’s) positionality 
cannot simply be read off from her (its) social situatedness, because the social and 
the spatial are mutually constitutive.’ This attitude is well-known to those familiar 
with critical participatory and action research, as well as feminist and postcolonial 
studies more widely.  
Critical geographers have discussed positionality and the situated nature of 
knowledge from spatial points of view extensively for over twenty years (e.g. Katz, 
1992, 2004; England, 1994; Rose, 1997; Valentine, 1998; Nightingale, 2003; 
Hopkins, 2007). In geographical childhood research, Cindi Katz, in particular, has 
paraded this methodological attitude throughout her work, making use of extensive 
field work projects carried out with children and young people in Howa (Sudan) 
and New York (US). Also other children’s and youth geographers have subsumed 
positionality and the situatedness of knowledge as a starting point of their 
methodological and ethical stance (e.g. Matthews, Limb & Taylor, 1998; Jones, 
2001; Valentine, 2003; Hopkins, 2007; Bell, 2008; Griffith, 2008; Hopkins & Bell, 
2008; Morrow, 2008; Vanderbeck, 2008; Kallio and Häkli, 2010).  
Like Leitner and Sheppard, geographers studying childhood and youth stress 
the importance of noticing both the connections between the researcher and the 
research subjects, and the spatial connection between related actors and sites. As 
Katz (1992, 505) states:‘[W]e must position ourselves on the borders between 
description and analysis; between here and there; between the present, past, and 
future; between the exotic and mundane; between the unique and general.’ 
Traditionally, these kinds of remarks are given in the context of ethnographic, 
participatory research. What I would like to suggest is that they can also be found 
useful when operating with different types of methods and materials, without 
engaging children in the process. 
The space of betweenness, as formulated by Katz, where sociospatial 
positionalities can be identified, is a topological space where various actors, 
matters  and  happenings  that  seem  remote  in  topographical space appear as 
connected. It is a space where individual and collective experiences and distinct 
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conceptions of childhood can be perceived in the same frame, and the relational 
processes of sociospatial co-evolvement explored. As Rose (1997) and England 
(1994) emphasise, both the researcher’s own position and the positions of those 
researched (who in childhood research are certainly not only the children!) form the 
lens through which these processes can be critically unfolded. Thus approached, 
participatory methods do not appear as the only relevant strategy for revealing 
hidden historical contents in childhoods and qualifying children’s silenced 
knowledges. Rather, they seem to generate a specific set of methods that, besides 
producing knowledge on certain issues, aim to provide children with resources for 
action (Kesby 2007, 2819; Lister, 2007).  
To complement the approaches that aim at such empowerment, a rigorous 
and multifaceted examination of children’s sociospatial positionalities may help to 
extract different kinds of situated knowledges from lived childhoods without 
engaging the children in the process as actual participants. Trails of subjugated 
childhoods can be followed by locating voices that are based on disqualified 
knowledges by, for instance, looking into children and young people’s acts and 
articulations in virtual (semi-)public spaces (chat forums, play and game worlds, 
social  media  sites,  etc.)  and  by  examining  their  ways  of  representing  themselves,  
relating themselves to others, and presenting ideas on specific matters. Another 
way to track children’s voices in their lived lives is to study the documented 
histories of childhood institutions as archives where qualified knowledges are 
celebrated (e.g. the school, the nursery, the maternity clinic). The children’s voices 
that do not inform these narratives can be identified as subjugated. Situating these 
voices into broader socio-cultural, politico-historical and geo-economic frames 
helps us to challenge the prevailing childhood discourses and come up with more 
pluralistic understandings of the worlds where children lead their lives (cf. Kallio, 
2009; Mitchell and Elwood, forthcoming).  
Taking into account the complexities related to participatory work with 
children, these kinds of methods can be found less challenging and risky in terms 
of research ethics (cf. the special issue of Ethics, Place and Environment, 2001). 
Therefore, I suggest that they are worthy of consideration, when applicable. As 
adults are engaged in and responsible for the process of listening, children can be, 
at least partly, released from voicing their concerns in particular situations. Instead, 
they  can  be  provided  with  the  right  to  “speak  freely”  for  themselves  in  their  
mundane environments. As in more traditional ethnographic research, the space of 
betweenness is employed to attain a diversified and critical understanding of the 
childhoods in each case. This allows for the empirical explication of the structures 
that frame and enable children’s lives in distinct locations, and the bringing to light 
of children’s knowledges that are developed in their lived childhoods. As an 
alternative to participatory strategies, this methodological approach provides one 
potential that enables the move from hearing selected children’s voices towards 
listening to the diversity of childhoods at play. 
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